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Abstract 
There is widespread concern currently that some ethnic minority communities within Britain, 
especially Muslim, are not following the stereotypical immigrant path of economic and 
cultural assimilation into British society.  Indeed, many seem to have the impression that 
differences between Muslims and non-Muslims are widening.  In this paper we compare the 
two largest Muslim communities in Britain (Pakistanis and Bangladeshis) with other ethnic 
minorities to ask the questions ‘are Muslims different?’ and ‘is their behaviour changing over 
time?’  The indicators we look at are the gender gap in education, age at marriage, 
cohabitation and inter-marriage, fertility and the employment of women.  In all these 
dimensions we find that the Muslim communities are different but we also find evidence of 
change.  This is partly because those born in Britain generally have markedly different 
behaviours from those born in the country of origin, but also because there is change within 
both the UK-born and foreign-born communities.  The evidence suggests there is, along 
almost all dimensions, a movement towards convergence in behaviour. 
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Introduction 
There is currently widespread concern, even alarm, that some ethnic minorities in the 
UK, predominantly Muslim, are not following the stereotypical immigrant path of 
economic and cultural assimilation into mainstream society.  It is a common belief (see 
the examples documented in Ruthven, 2002, and Poole, 2002) that a growing fraction of 
Muslims who live (and in many cases were born) in Britain do not think of themselves as 
British, have no aspiration to do so and do not want their children to either1. Instead, it is 
feared, they subscribe to some other identity, creating little enclaves that resemble, as far 
as is possible, the countries from which they came or a model of the good society very 
different from what is generally thought of as ‘Britain’. Lurid tales of forced marriage, 
honour killings, and hate-filled religious literature within these communities spilling out 
into rioting (in 1989, 2001 and 2005) and recent terrorist plots lead to a less than 
flattering image of British Muslim communities amongst many non-Muslims.  Though 
these events are real enough, they are also rare.  However, there is a very widespread 
popular belief that Muslims are ‘different’ (and a small academic literature - see, for 
example, Constant et al, 2006, and Bisin et al, 2007).  Many also believe that the ideas of 
radical Islam are taking a growing hold over these communities so that differences 
between communities are actually growing over time2.  For example, the final report of 
                                                 
1
 Though see Zimmermann and Zimmermann and Constant (2008), Constant, Gataullina, Zimmermann and 
Zimmermann (2008) and Manning and Roy (2007) for evidence abut the determinants of identity among 
immigrants and ethnic minorities.  Constant and Zimmerman (2008) also provide evidence on the link 
between identity and outcomes. 
2
 To give but one example, the Daily Telegraph of January 20 2006 contained an article with the statement 
“the findings depict a Muslim community becoming more radical and feeling more alienated from 
mainstream society”. 
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the Commission for Racial Equality (2007, p4) wrote that “extremism both political and 
religious is on the rise as people become disillusioned and disconnected from each other”.   
 In this paper we have a modest aim – to seek to document the ways in which 
Muslims in Britain differ from other communities and how these differences are evolving 
over time.  To do this, we compare the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities in Britain 
(who are 97% Muslim and are 55% of all Muslims in Britain) with three other large 
ethnic minority communities – Indians, Black Caribbeans and Chinese.  We study a 
number of different dimensions of behaviour chosen to be both measurable and to capture 
important aspects of the ways in which Muslims are perceived to be ‘different’ – we 
consider the gender gap in education (it often being alleged that less importance is 
attached to girls’ education), marriage patterns, fertility and female employment.  
The plan of the paper is as follows.  The next section summarizes very briefly the 
voluminous existing literature on the economic and social circumstances of ethnic 
minorities in Britain. However, most (though not all) of this literature focuses on 
snapshots of differences at a point in time – there is much less in the way of research into 
changes over time and this is the main focus of our paper.  The second section provides 
details about the data used in our analysis and presents some descriptive statistics as 
background for our findings in subsequent sections. The third section studies the gender 
gap in educational attainment, a measure chosen to reflect the alleged lower priority 
given to the welfare of women.  The fourth section then studies marriage patterns, with 
information on age of marriage, marriage from the source country, cohabitation and inter-
racial marriage.  The fifth section then focuses on fertility and the sixth on employment 
rates of women.  In all of these areas we do find that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are 
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‘different’ in ways that are in line with the of popular perception – women have less 
education than men, they marry young, have a high propensity to take spouses from the 
country of origin, have more children and low female employment rates.  But, we also 
find evidence of marked change in all these areas and this change is always in the 
direction of the behaviour of the other ethnic minorities and the indigenous British 
population (a conclusion in line with the more general thesis about global trends put 
forward by Courbage and Todd, 2007).  This is partly because the behaviour of those 
born in the UK is very different from those born in the country of origin, but also because 
there are generational changes among both the UK-born and foreign-born.  The final 
section of the paper shows that all of these changes are occurring within communities 
who continue to define themselves as resolutely Muslim – it is not the result of rising 
secularism, although there are very modest changes towards fewer practising their 
religion. 
 
1. Existing Literature 
There is a vast amount of research on the ways in which the economic and social 
circumstances of ethnic minorities in Britain differs from that of the indigenous white 
population3.  The earliest papers on economic outcomes (most commonly measured as 
earnings, employment and unemployment) were probably Chiswick (1980) and Stewart 
(1983).  Since then, there have been many studies, considering diversity in the ethnic 
minority experience (see Blackaby et al, 1997; Modood et al, 1997; Clark and 
Drinkwater, 2007; Elliott and Lindley, 2008 inter alia), the difference between first- and 
                                                 
3
 There is also an enormous literature which we do not seek to summarize here on other countries – see 
Adsera and Chiswick (2007) for an interesting comparison of European countries. 
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second-generation immigrants (e.g. Blackaby et al, 2002, 2005), the importance of 
language fluency (Leslie and Lindley, 2001; Lindley, 2002b; Dustmann and Fabbri, 
2003), rates of assimilation (Bell, 1997; Clark and Lindley, 2006), the role of religion as 
opposed to ethnicity (Lindley, 2002a), and differences in time-use (Zaiceva and 
Zimmermann, 2007).  These studies have given us excellent snapshots of the position of 
different ethnic minorities.  In particular, earnings and employment penalties are typically 
found to be largest for the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis who are among the most 
economically disadvantaged groups in British society.   
But, there is much less in the way of research into how this is changing over time.  
This is probably due to the fact that many ethnic minority populations in Britain are of 
relatively recent origin so that it has been hard to say anything very precise about trends.  
But there are a number of recent studies that do explicitly address the question of changes 
over time.  Lindley, Dale and Dex (2006) investigate how women’s employment rates 
among ethnic minorities have been changing, paying particular attention to the changing 
role of education.  Clark and Drinkwater (2007) compare data from the 1991 and 2001 
censuses, looking at the way in which employment and unemployment rates have 
changed for different ethnic minorities.  They find little change in the gap in employment 
rates between Pakistanis and Bangladeshis on the one hand and whites on the other.  
Similar persistence in employment disadvantage is found in Berthoud and Blekesaune 
(2007) using General Household Survey data from 1974 to 2003. 
An impression one gets from these studies of change is that the Pakistanis and the 
Bangladeshis are insular, peculiarly resistant to change and very different from other 
immigrant groups and much of the rest of British society.  This view is not new - for 
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example, a book on the main ethnic minorities in Britain analysing data from the 1991 
census (Peach, 1996) used the following chapter titles to summarize each of the main 
ethnic minority communities: 
-  Black-Caribbeans: class, gender and geography. 
- The Indians: onward and upward 
- Pakistanis: stability and introspection 
- Bangladeshis: the encapsulated community 
- Chinese: upwardly mobile 
It is clear that the image presented of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis is of communities 
much less dynamic than the Indians and Chinese.  And the recent Equalities Review 
(Cabinet Office, 2007), concluded that employment rates among Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi women will never be the same as among white women, a startlingly strong 
statement. 
 This paper is concerned with whether this picture of lack of dynamism is accurate.  
We consider a number of different aspects of economic and social life chosen to be both 
measurable and to capture some of the main ways (though we make no claim to be 
exhaustive) in which the Muslim communities are thought to be ‘different’ – the gender 
gap in education, marriage and fertility, and female employment4.  We document the 
extent to which these groups are different and the extent to which this has changed over 
time.   To evaluate the extent of difference we need a benchmark.  In this paper we 
primarily compare Pakistanis and Bangladeshis to the other large ethnic minorities in 
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 There other interesting dimensions along which Muslims might be different that we do not study.   For 
example, in the course of this research we also used the British Social Attitudes Survey to investigate 
attitudes to women’s rights and homosexuality.  We did find Muslims are markedly more hostile to 
homosexuality though all religious people are more hostile than those without a religion.  However, small 
sample sizes meant we could not say anything about changes over time.  
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Britain – Indians5, Black Caribbeans and Chinese – but the other obvious alternative is to 
the white British population.  We choose the other ethnic minorities as a comparison 
because their experience is more likely to be comparable but our qualitative conclusions 
would be much the same if we used an alternative benchmark.  To evaluate the extent of 
change, the existing literature tends to estimate repeated cross-sections but we take a 
different approach.  Because many of the outcome variables we consider are largely 
lifetime decisions and attitudes (e.g. education, marriage, and fertility) we focus on 
estimating cohort effects – whether later generations differ substantially from older 
generations.  In addition, we often look at the difference in behaviour among the UK and 
foreign-born, an issue that receives surprisingly little attention in much of the existing 
literature, given the sizeable differences in behaviour we document in this paper.   
 
2. Data and Background 
The main data used in this paper comes from the Labour Force Survey (LFS).  This was 
conducted every two years from 1975-1983, then annually until 1992 and quarterly since 
that date.  Information on ethnicity (which is always self-reported) at a level of 
disaggregation suitable for our purposes is only available since 1979 so that our sample 
period is 1979-2006. 
 We start with some simple descriptive statistics.  In this paper we focus primarily 
on a comparison of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi community with Indians, Black 
                                                 
5
 About 12% of the Indians in the UK are Muslim but, because a religion question is only asked in the 
Labour Force Survey since 2002, we cannot conduct our analysis restricting the Indian sample to non-
Muslims.  What analysis we have done, does suggest an effect of religion within the Indian community 
with Muslims and Sikhs being more ‘traditional’ in their practices.  But as the Muslims are only a small 
minority of Indians, it must be the behaviour of non-Muslims that accounts of most of what we see in the 
Indian community.   
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Caribbeans and Chinese, the other large ethnic minorities in the UK.  Figure 1 shows how 
the proportions of these ethnic minorities in the total population have changed over time.  
Indians are the largest group representing 2% of the total population in 2006, followed by 
Pakistanis at 1.5%, Black Caribbeans at 1% and Chinese and Bangladeshis at 0.5%.  All 
of the ethnic groups from the Indian sub-continent have grown in size over the past 25 
years while the size of the Black Caribbean community has hardly changed.  This growth 
will almost certainly continue into the future as many of the ethnic minorities have a 
much younger age structure as can be seen in Table 1 – just under 12% of Pakistanis and 
over 12% of Bangladeshis were aged under 4 in 2001 compared to under 6% of the white 
population. 
 The different time profiles of the different communities largely reflect the fact 
that they arrived in the UK at different times, something that also shows up in the 
proportion of each community that is UK-born.  Figure 2 shows how the fraction of 
adults in each ethnic minority that is foreign-born has changed over time.  This shows 
that Black Caribbeans have the highest fraction UK-born, reflecting the fact that their 
immigration into the UK began earliest (in the 1950s).  Then are Pakistanis and Indians6 
who began to arrive in large numbers in the 1960s.  The Bangladeshi and Chinese 
communities are more recent so have the lowest proportion of UK-born among adults.  
For all ethnic minorities the fraction UK-born is rising – the only exceptions to this are 
the Chinese and Indians in recent years. 
 For those adults who are foreign-born, Figure 3 shows that average time since 
arrival in the UK.  This is rising for all groups with the exception of Chinese and Indians 
                                                 
6
 This is the case for adults only whereas if one considers also children then Bangladeshis have the third 
highest proportion of UK-born. 
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in recent years.  The fact that none of these lines rise one year at a time shows there is 
continued immigration.  But the bottom line is that these figures show that the ethnic 
minority communities are maturing, with the population having weaker links with the 
countries of origin and closer links to the UK.  Another way of looking at the same thing 
is to look at the fraction of children who have one or both parents foreign-born.  Figure 4 
shows how this has been changing over time7.  For all the ethnic minorities shown, the 
vast majority of children born after 2000 still have at least one parent who is foreign-
born, and for the Bangladeshis there are almost no children with both parents UK-born.  
This pattern reflects not just the timing of immigration but the practice (that remains 
common and is documented further below) of seeking a spouse from the country of 
origin.  However there is change over time – the proportion of ethnic minority children 
with both parents UK-born is increasing. 
 However, the interesting question is whether the behaviours of these communities 
are changing as the communities become more distant from the country of origin.  We 
now turn to this question. 
 
3. The Gender Gap in Education 
One of the main ways in which the predominantly Muslim ethnic minority communities 
are thought to be very different from the other ethnic minorities and the indigenous UK 
population is in attitudes towards gender equality.  One way of looking for evidence of 
this is to compare the educational attainment of men and women.  Table 2 shows that 
there is a sizeable gender gap in average age left full-time education among the Pakistani 
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 Black Caribbeans are excluded from these graphs as the proportion with both UK-born parents is much 
higher – around 44% for those born after 1980. 
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and Bangladeshi populations in 2006 of 2.2 years, a gap larger than that found amongst 
the other main ethnic minority groups – the gender gap among Indians and Chinese is 
about 1 year8.  More striking still is the proportion of men and women who have left full-
time education by the age of 13. As suggested by table 2, 12% of Pakistani and 16% of 
Bangladeshi women are in this category, a much higher proportion than among other 
ethnic minorities and much higher than the men in their communities9.  
But, this is simply a snapshot at a point in time and says nothing about the extent 
and pace of change.  There are a number of possible reasons to expect to see change over 
time.  First, there are quite likely to be differences in educational attainment between the 
UK- and foreign-born.  For example, it should not be possible for those born and bred in 
the UK to leave education by the age of 13 while this remains possible in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh10.  As the communities mature and the fraction UK-born rises, this will tend 
to raise the level of educational attainment and reduce the gender gap.  But it is likely that 
there are also changes over time both among the UK- and foreign-born. For example, the 
education system is changing quite rapidly within both Pakistan and Bangladesh.  To get 
some indication that there is change in these countries, figure 5 shows the gender gap in 
years of education by birth cohort (we choose to do things by birth cohort as education is 
a lifetime decision) for the foreign-born – there is a very marked downward trend.  For 
those born before 1930 the gender gap in age left full-time of education for Pakistanis 
was about 7 years and about 5 years for Bangladeshis – much higher than for the other 
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 For the UK-born white population the gender gap in age left full-time education is about 0.15 years for 
those born prior to 1960 and zero thereafter. 
9
 It is worth noting that very low levels of education are more prevalent among Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
men than for the other groups.  This reflects the fact that these immigrant groups primarily come from poor 
rural backgrounds. 
10
 However, it is possible for someone to be UK-born, then move to Pakistan/Bangladesh, leave education 
early and later return to the UK. 
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ethnic minorities.  But for those born after 1970 the gender gap is reduced to 2 years only 
slightly above that for Indians and Chinese though still higher than for Black Caribbeans 
(among whom the women are, on average, better-educated than the men).   
There are two possible reasons for this declining gender gap in education – 
changes in the way migrants are selected and changes in the population in the countries of 
origin.  It is hard to assess the relative importance of these two factors but other sources 
suggest that that the gender gap in educational attainment in both countries has been 
falling markedly over time.  For example, the large gender gap in education in Pakistan 
has been noted previously (see Aslam and Kingdon, 2007) but has been falling.  For 
example, the 2005/06 Pakistani Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey11 
shows that among those living in rural areas (the origin of most Pakistani immigrants to 
the UK), only 2% of women aged 60+ had ever attended school compared to 26% of 
men.  For those aged 10-14 years 33% of women have attended school compared to 61% 
of men.  Bangladesh has seen even more dramatic change having already met its 
Millennium Development Goal of gender parity in primary and secondary school 
enrolment rates – it is now often singled out by the World Bank as a model of how to set 
about doing this.  So, there is substantial change within both Pakistan and Bangladesh to 
reduce the gender gap in education and this has an effect on the immigrants from those 
countries into Britain.   
Table 3 presents estimates of the gender gap in education for the main ethnic 
minorities for different birth cohorts for the foreign- and UK-born to provide a clearer 
picture of these trends.  We try to maintain a consistent structure for our regression 
models across all our outcome variables so we will describe this approach here.  We are 
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 Available at  http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/fbs/statistics/pslm2005_06/2.2.pdf 
12 
 
interested in the effects of cohort and of being foreign-born so we typically include as 
controls dummies variables for broad birth cohort, separately for both the UK and 
foreign-born.  Because there are very few individuals in our sample communities who 
were born in the UK in the early years we only report estimates for two British-born 
cohorts – those born before and after 1970 – whereas for the foreign-born we report 
more.   
The main features that stand out from Table 3 are that the gender gaps in 
education are largest among the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (though not zero for the 
Indians and foreign-born Chinese) and very dramatic for those born prior to 1950.  
However, one also sees evidence of change – there are lower gaps among the UK-born 
and falling gaps among the foreign-born.  For the latest birth cohorts, the gender gap in 
education is still largest for the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis but the gap with the Indians 
is no longer what it once was. Although the gender gap remains largest for Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis it is now relatively small.   
 To summarize: the gender gap in educational attainment is larger among Pakistani 
and Banglasdeshi communities than for the other main ethnic minorities.  In large part, 
this is the result of enormous past differences in the educational attainment of men and 
women in the countries of origin.  But there is very rapid change, driven in part by 
changes in the country of origin (changes within the foreign-born) and in part because of 
the change in the share of the communities who are UK-born.  Our conclusions here are 
consistent with those of more qualitative studies (e.g. Ahmad, 2003) who conclude that 
cultures often portrayed as opposed to the education and employment of women seem to 
be producing increasing numbers of highly motivated young women.  
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4. Marriage 
It is well-known that South Asian communities in general, and Bangladeshi and Pakistani 
communities in particular, tend to get married young, often to spouses from the country 
of origin in arranged marriages12, and have low rates of cohabitation and exogamy (see, 
for example, Modood et al, 1997, or Bethoud, 2005).  In this section, we examine trends 
in some of these outcomes to consider the extent of change.  
Marriage rates at age 25 
 As a single summary measure of the tendency to marry, we use the fraction of the 
population aged 18-25 inclusive who are married or co-habiting.  This measure is chosen 
because it is among this age group that the differences in marriage rates across ethnic 
minorities seem to be largest.  Figure 6a shows the proportion of men of different ages 
who report being married (or co-habiting), by birth cohort and ethnic minority.  Figure 6b 
does the same for women.  One sees that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are more likely to 
be married young but also that this has been changing rapidly over time.  Based on figure 
6b, 80% of Bangladeshi women born before 1960 were married by the age of 25 – this 
has fallen to 40% for the latest birth cohorts13.  It is natural to try to relate this 
generational change to a growing fraction who are UK-born and to rising education 
among women, both factors likely to be associated with later marriage.  To investigate 
this further, table 4a reports the results of regressions in which the sample is women aged 
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 Some of these practices have been the subject of UK legislation to restrict the entry of spouses below the 
age of 18 and to impose a requirement that the prospective spouses have previously met.   
13
 It is worth noting that very early marriage remains extremely common in many parts of rural Bangladesh 
(see Field and Ambrus, 2008) where it is seen as something of a ‘problem’ that policy is trying to address. 
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18-2514, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for being married and we include as 
controls age, birth cohort and whether the respondent was born in the UK.  The first row 
shows the estimated marriage rate for a woman aged 25 who is born in the UK in 1970 or 
after.  This shows that marriage rates are highest amongst Pakistanis and Bangladeshis at 
approximately 50% but not much lower among Indians – 45%.  Marriage rates are 
considerably lower among the Chinese and much lower among Black Caribbeans.  The 
bottom half of the table then reports estimates of deviations in marriage rates from the 
base group for different birth cohorts, UK- and foreign-born.  One sees higher marriage 
rates among the foreign-born and those born earlier so that there is evidence here that 
marriage rates are falling for both the foreign- and UK-born groups.  Indians are very 
similar in all dimensions to Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, though the generational change 
is much less marked for Black Caribbeans and the Chinese (a finding in line with the 
analysis of Berthoud, 2005). 
 One of the factors that may lie behind declining marriage rates is the rising 
education we saw in the previous section15.  Accordingly table 4b is similar to table 4a 
but now includes years of education as an extra control.  For all ethnic groups more 
education is associated with later marriage – a Bangladeshi woman with a degree is 
estimated to be something like 10% less likely to be married at age 25 than one who left 
school at 16.  The estimated effect of education is larger for Indians and Chinese than 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.  The effect is smallest for Black Caribbeans.  The effects of 
                                                 
14
 We also estimated similar models for men for whom the results are similar though less striking as they 
tend to marry later.  In the interest of brevity we do not report those estimates here. 
15
 There is a tricky causality issue here – it may be that later marriage leads to more education rather than 
more education to later marriage.  We do not have a suitable instrument to deal adequately with 
disentangling this here.  But there is a widespread belief that education in general (and female education in 
particular) is an important way to change behaviour.  
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birth cohort are still present though reduced in magnitude as one would expect given that 
education is higher for later generations. 
 Hence, although there are very significant differences in age of marriage across 
the different ethnic minority communities, there is marked convergence in behaviour. 
 
Marriage from the Source Country   
  It is also interesting to consider the propensity to marry someone from the 
country of origin.  For this purpose we divide the ethnic minority population into those 
born in the UK or who came before the age of 16 on the one hand (i.e. all those who 
arrived in the UK before they were of legally marriageable age) and those who came after 
the age of 16 on the other.  Table 5 shows the propensity of these two groups to have a 
spouse who entered the UK after the age of 16.   
 Table 6 shows that among Pakistanis, 58% of the foreign-born have a spouse who 
arrived in the UK as an adult.  A large majority of those probably married in Pakistan.  
But, among those who were born in the UK or came as children, the percentage with a 
foreign-born spouse is higher at 65%.  The Bangladeshis show a similar pattern though 
the proportions with a spouse who came to the UK as an adult is somewhat higher.  This 
is a remarkable finding as it implies that if one takes at random a Pakistani or 
Bangladeshi who is UK-born or came as a child they are more likely to have a spouse 
who arrived as an adult than one who came as an adult themselves.  This pattern can only 
be explained in terms of the practice of arranging the marriage of someone already in the 
UK to someone from the home country.  That it is a very unusual pattern can be seen by 
looking at the other ethnic groups where having come to the UK as an adult is associated 
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with a much higher probability of  having a foreign-born spouse.  This is true even for the 
Indians and Chinese among whom the practice of taking a spouse from the home country 
is not unknown.  The bottom two panels of table 5 show that this pattern is true for both 
men and women with only minor differences.  There are a number of possible 
explanations for this practice – marriage among first cousins remains common among 
Pakistanis (the survey of ethnic minorities in 1994 found that 60% of Pakistanis were 
married to a cousin) and most of these are in the home country, or it may be that those in 
the UK are a ‘good catch’ in the marriage market back in Pakistan or Bangladesh so one 
can get a ‘better’ spouse in that marriage market. 
 The extent of this practice has a number of implications.  First, it implies that the 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities are going to grow faster than they otherwise 
would as the immigration of a spouse increases the size of the community.  Secondly it 
means that the fraction foreign-born in these communities will not fall as fast as it 
otherwise would.  As we have already seen the UK-born and foreign-born differ along a 
number of dimensions (e.g. education and marriage) so that this practice will also prolong 
the differences between these communities and others in the UK.  And a higher fraction 
of children in these communities will have at least one parent who is foreign-born. 
 Although the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities stand out in this regard, we 
might also be interested in whether there is any evidence of changing practice.  To 
investigate this we estimated simple models for the probability of having a spouse who 
came to the UK as an adult for the sample of those who are UK-born or arrived as a child.  
On the right-hand side we include birth cohort, education, whether the individual is 
foreign-born and gender.  The results are reported in table 6.  The first row reports the 
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baseline estimates of having a spouse who arrived as an adult for a man, UK-born after 
1970 who left education aged 16.  These baseline probabilities are much higher for 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis at over 60% than for the other ethnic minority groups.  
However education is negatively associated with having a spouse who is an adult 
immigrant – a Bangladeshi graduate would be 10 percentage points less likely to have a 
spouse who is an adult immigrant. Moreover, whether the respondent is foreign-born (i.e. 
they came to the UK as a child) has a large positive effect on having a spouse who is an 
adult immigrant – something over 10 percentage points for all ethnic groups except of 
Black Caribbeans.  The most likely explanation is that those who came as children do 
have stronger links with the country of origin.  Gender differences are not particularly 
large (except for the Chinese group) and vary in sign across ethnic groups with no very 
obvious explanation. 
 Turning to the cohort effects, these are much smaller in magnitude than those we 
have seen in other regressions and not always monotonic.  For example, Pakistanis born 
after 1970 seem about 5 percentage points more likely to have a spouse who immigrated 
as an adult than those born in the 1960s.  This is one area where the pace of generational 
change seems slow to non-existent, though rising education and an increasing fraction 
UK-born would be expected to reduce the incidence of taking spouses from the country 
of origin. 
 
Co-habitation and Inter-racial Marriage 
 One other area that might be thought of as evidence of declining social 
conservatism is the incidence of co-habitation and inter-racial marriage.  Figure 7 
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presents the fraction of couples in partnerships who are co-habiting.  For both Chinese 
and Caribbeans there is a high incidence and the trend is strongly upwards.  But for 
groups from the Indian sub-continent the incidence remains extremely low at less than 
2% and the trend is not very clear (though small sample sizes make these series very 
noisy).  It would appear that there remains very strong social pressure against co-
habitation within these communities (see, also Berthoud, 2005).   
Figure 8 shows how rates of inter-racial marriage have changed over time.  Rates 
are again much lower for those groups from the Indian sub-continent than for Chinese 
and Caribbeans though, again, there is some sign of a very modest upward trend. 
 To summarize: age of marriage is lower for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis than for 
other ethnic minorities but is rising quite fast so that their difference is eroding.  
However, these two groups do stand out in having an extremely high rate of marriage 
with those in the country of origin.  This practice seems to be eroding only slowly if at 
all.  It would also seem there are quite strong taboos against co-habitation and inter-racial 
marriage and these practices remain rare among all the South Asian groups. 
   
5. Fertility 
In this section we consider the number of children. The general perception is that most 
ethnic minorities have higher birth rates than the white UK-born population and, within 
ethnic minorities, the birth rate is particularly high for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (see, 
for example, Coleman, 1994, for an earlier analysis).  For example, table 9.5 of the 2005 
Birth Statistics produced by the Office for National Statistics16   shows that the total 
fertility rate for mothers born in the UK fell from 1.8 to 1.6 from 1991 to 2001.  
                                                 
16
 Available at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_population/FM1_34/Table9.5.xls  
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However, for mothers born in India the estimated total fertility rate went from 2.5 to 2.3, 
for mothers born in Pakistan from 4.8 to 4.7 and for those born in Bangladesh from 5.3 to 
3.9.  This gives the impression that there is very little change among the Pakistanis and 
Indians though substantial change among the Bangladeshis. However, it is much harder 
to get statistics on fertility by ethnicity rather than country of birth.  In addition, the total 
fertility rate is computed by averaging the birth rate at different ages at a point in time, a 
methodology that makes it very hard to identify cohort effects. 
 Our approach to investigating fertility is to take a sample of women and use as 
dependent variable the number of dependent children in the household.  As explanatory 
variables we have a polynomial in the age of the woman (these coefficients are not 
reported), birth cohort, and whether foreign-born.  In some specifications we also include 
education (see table 7b).  One problem with the dependent variable as a measure of 
fertility is that it is not possible in the LFS to measure total live births – we only know if 
children are currently present in the household.  To give a simple measure of fertility we 
report baseline estimates at age 30 in table 7a.  One sees in the baseline specification the 
higher fertility for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (approximately 2 children per woman) 
while Indians and Black Caribbeans have about 1.3 and Chinese 1.  For all groups except 
the Chinese one sees lower fertility rate among the UK-born and for more recent 
generations.  Hence we do find evidence of declining fertility among Pakistanis, contrary 
to the ONS data on total fertility rates.  However, the rate of decline in fertility does seem 
faster for the Bangladeshis. 
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 Looking at fertility, one again comes to a similar conclusion – that Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis are different in the ways that popular culture suggests but there is also 
evidence of considerable change so that they are becoming less different over time.   
 
6. Female Employment 
It is well-known that employment rates for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are much lower 
than for other ethnic groups, for both men and women (see, for example, Cabinet Office, 
2003).  However it is the low employment rates of women that are often singled out for 
particular attention as they are so large and thought to be the result of cultural 
preferences.  Indeed the equalities review went so far as to say that the gap in 
employment rates between Pakistani/Banglasdeshi and white women would never be 
eliminated (Cabinet Office, 2007).  Similar conclusions can be found in Berthoud and 
Blekesaune (2007) and Clark and Drinkwater (2007). 
 Figure 9 shows a time series for female employment rates for the different ethnic 
groups.  Employment rates among Pakistani and Bangladeshi women in 2006 are about 
20% whereas they are about 60% for other ethnic groups.  Although employment rates 
for Pakistani and Bangladeshi women have been rising, the same is true for the other 
ethnic groups and the gap has not obviously been closing – hence, the conclusion noted 
above.  However, employment rates for women are likely to be strongly affected by 
education, country of birth, marital status and numbers of children, all things that we have 
shown to be changing over time. 
 The effect of being foreign-born is remarkable.  Table 8 shows the employment 
rates for women by ethnic group for UK- and foreign-born.  For all ethnic groups 
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employment rates are higher among the UK-born than among the foreign-born but there 
is an enormous effect among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.  UK-born Pakistani women 
have employment rates of 45% while it is 18% for the foreign-born.  For the 
Bangladeshis the gap is even larger – 48% for the UK-born and 12% for the foreign-born.  
However, employment rates among UK-born Pakistani and Bangladeshi women are still 
much lower than for other ethnic minorities.  As Table 8 shows this difference is much 
more marked among married than single women, and among married women with 
dependent children.  One interpretation of this finding is that Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
women are currently further back along the curve by which female employment rates rose 
in the Western world.  As a crude stereotype, women used to stop working after marriage, 
then they only stopped after having children, and then they went back to work with 
younger and younger dependent children.  To give some idea of where Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi women are now, the final column of table 8 reports employment rates for US 
women in 1950 (we do not have access to data from a similar time period for UK 
women).  The overall employment rate then was 28%, but 73% for single women and 
16.7% for married women with dependent children.  These numbers are quite similar to 
those we see for Pakistani and Bangladeshi women in the UK today.  One intriguing 
possibility is that these women are following a similar trajectory to that followed by US 
(and, probably UK) women over the past 50 years.  
 Tables 9a-9d explore this further reporting the results from regressions where the 
dependent variable is whether the woman is in employment. The regressors are similar to 
those reported earlier – whether UK- or foreign-born, birth cohort and education.  
Education is interacted with being foreign-born as the work of Lindley et al (2006) 
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suggests this is important.  Age is also included but these coefficients are not reported.  In 
table 9a, the sample is all women. The first row reports the estimated employment rate for 
a woman aged 30, born in the UK after 1970 who left education at age 16 and the other 
rows report the effects of deviations from that base group.  The first row shows that, 
among the base group, female employment rates are approximately 25 percentage points 
lower among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.  Employment rates rise with education and 
education effects are somewhat larger for the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.  There is no 
evidence for a marked cohort effect among the UK- or foreign-born.  But the foreign-
born have lower employment rates than the UK-born (except for the Black Caribbean 
group) with effects that are around 20 percentage points for the Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis. 
 Table 9b then restricts the sample to single women without dependent children.  
Employment rates among the base group are not much lower for Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis than for the other communities.  Education has a positive effect (except for 
Bangladeshis and Chinese) but the other variables are generally insignificant with the 
exception that foreign-born Pakistanis have much lower employment rates.  This suggests 
that differences in employment rates among single women of the different ethnic 
minorities are relatively small.  This is confirmed by table 9c which restricts the sample 
to married women without children.  Again, for the base group employment rates are 
lower for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis but the effect of being foreign-born and of an older 
generation are enormous for these groups.  This suggests that rapid change is taking place 
within these communities in attitudes towards the employment of married women when 
there are not dependent children in the household.  But as table 9d shows, when one 
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restricts the sample to married women with dependent children the gap in employment 
rates relative to married women without children is very large and the effects of being 
foreign-born are much reduced.  This suggests that the Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
communities are at the point where the attitudes towards the employment of married 
women without children is changing but that the birth of children continues to have a 
large negative effect on female employment.  
 This section has shown that while employment rates for Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi women remain much lower than for other ethnic minorities, there is 
evidence of change.  In particular, women from these groups would seem to be following 
the trajectory for female employment followed by women in the UK more generally, 
whereby more married women start working followed by married women with children.  
The quantitative conclusions we have drawn here mesh well with the more qualitative 
studies of Ahmad, Lissenburgh and Modood (2003) and Aston et al (2007). 
 
7. Religiosity 
The paper so far has documented how the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities are 
different from other ethnic minorities and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable 
future.  However, we have also emphasized how it is wrong to think of these 
communities as static- they are undergoing substantial change in almost all of the areas 
we have considered and that change is in the direction of convergence towards other 
groups.  That change is happening not just because these communities are maturing and 
more members of them coming under the influence of British culture and habits but also 
because there is substantial change in the countries of origin. 
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 One question that arises from this is whether these changes in behaviour are 
occurring as a result of the influence of secularism within the communities or whether 
they continue to describe themselves as religious.  Since 2002 the Labour Force Survey 
has collected data on religion and table 10 documents the proportions describing 
themselves as of different religions for the five ethnic minorities we have considered in 
this paper.  The groups from the Indian sub-continent remain extremely religious – very 
few report having no religion compared to 50% of the Chinese.  The Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis are overwhelmingly Muslim with, in particular, very small numbers 
reporting they have no religion.  It is hard to know from this data whether the non-
Muslims have converted or were brought up that way (there being small religious 
minorities in both countries).  To get a better idea of this we turn to the 2003 Home 
Office Citizenship Survey that asks about the religion (if any) in which one was raised 
and the religion (if any) that one is practising now.  The data, summarized in table 11, 
show that Muslims show much higher ‘retention’ rates than the other faiths – almost 90% 
of those who were brought up Muslim continue to practice their faith.  The retention rate 
among Hindus and Sikhs is also high at around 75% compared to the Black Caribbeans 
and Chinese.  However, as the fourth and fifth columns show there is a difference in the 
retention rate between the UK-born and foreign-born with the UK-born of all faiths being 
less likely to continue to practice their religion.  However, the difference between the 
UK-born and foreign-born is less marked for Muslims than for the other faiths. 
 Being UK-born is correlated with other factors like age and education that might 
also be expected to affect whether one practices his/her religion.  In order to investigate 
this a bit further we return to the LFS which, after asking for one’s religion, also asks 
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whether one is practicing it.  Table 12 shows the result of estimating a linear probability 
model for whether one is practising religion.  The baseline group is a man, UK-born after 
1970 who left full-time education at 16 – the baseline probability of practising a religion 
is 81% for Pakistanis, 90% for Bangladeshis.  However the Indians are also high at 80%, 
much higher than the Black Caribbeans and Chinese – the latter group having a baseline 
probability of 6%.  In terms of the effect of education, this only has a significant effect 
for Pakistanis where the more educated are less likely to practice and for Black 
Caribbeans where the educated are more likely to be practising.  Pakistani and Chinese 
students are significantly more likely to be practising.  Pakistani, Indian and Black 
Caribbean women are more likely to be practising with a particularly large effect for the 
last group.  Turning to the cohort effects there is no evidence of declining religiosity 
among UK-born Pakistanis and Bangladeshis though there is among Indians and Black 
Caribbeans.  The foreign-born are more likely to be practising than the UK-born though 
there is a marked negative cohort effect for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis – immigrants 
from these countries seem to be becoming less religious. 
 What this suggests is that, while there is some evidence of a move towards being 
less religious among all the ethnic minorities studied here, the move is less marked for 
Muslims than for those of other faiths.  The overwhelming majority of Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis will describe themselves as Muslims for generations to come and a majority 
will continue to practice their faith (this is consistent with the evidence in Bisin et al, 
2007, that Muslims are more serious about their faith than adherents to other religions).  
The changes in behaviour documented earlier in this paper are occurring among people 
who continue to describe themselves as Muslim, not as a result of a drift away from Islam 
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and the active embracing of secularism.  The obvious interpretation of this finding is that 
the members of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities see the changes in cultural 
practice we have documented in this paper as not being in conflict with their conception 
of what it means to be a good and devout Muslim.  It would seem that Islam, as practiced 
by these communities, is a flexible religion, capable considerable change in norms of 
behaviour.   
 
8. Conclusions 
This paper has compared the behaviours of the largest ethnic minorities in Britain with 
the intention of seeing whether the Muslim groups – the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis – 
are different.  We considered a wide, though not exhaustive17, range of indicators – the 
gender gap in education, age at marriage, cohabitation and inter-racial marriage, fertility 
and female employment.  In all these dimensions the Muslim groups are different and in 
what is probably the expected direction.  But, there is also convergence towards the 
behaviour of other ethnic minorities.  This is partly because the UK-born within these 
communities are markedly different from the foreign-born, but also because of change 
among the UK- and foreign-born.  However, we have also shown that this is happening 
while almost everyone in these groups continues to describe themselves as Muslim so 
what are often thought of as being secular values are, for these groups, being embodied in 
a changing set of behaviours deemed appropriate within Islam. 
                                                 
17
 For example, it might also be interesting to look at educational attainment among children (see Modood, 
2005) or segregation (see Briggs et al, 2005; Burgess et al, 2006a,b) 
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Notes: Data source is Labour Force Survey (LFS), 1983-2006.  Data refer to population aged 16 or over.  
Years of arrival only asked in LFS since 1983.
 
10
15
20
25
30
35
n
u
m
be
r 
of
 
ye
a
rs
83 86 90 95 00 06
year
Pakistanis Bangladeshis
Indians Black Caribbeans
Chinese
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
pr
o
po
rti
o
n
before 70s 70s 80s 90s 2000 and after
birth cohort
Pakistanis Bangladeshis
Indians Chinese
Children with Both Parents Foreign-Born
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
pr
op
or
tio
n
before 70s 70s 80s 90s 2000 and after
birth cohort
Pakistanis Bangladeshis
Indians Chinese
Children with One Foreign-Born Parent
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
pr
op
o
rti
o
n
before 70s 70s 80s 90s 2000 and after
birth cohort
Pakistanis Bangladeshis
Indians Chinese
Children with No Foreign-Born Parent
)(*+,-)*+./	2
%	
 
                                                                                                                                                                  44

45 
 
0
,
99 0
#7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Data source is Labour Force Survey (LFS), 1979-2006.  Data refer to all foreign-born individuals 
aged 26 or over who arrived in the UK after completing full-time education. 
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Figure 9 
The Incidence of Inter-racial Marriage 
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